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Abstract 
 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the interaction between financial liberalization, 
banking crisis and economic growth by taking into consideration the role of institutions. Our 
sample covers ten Middle East and North African (MENA henceforth) observed during the 
period 1990-2013. Using a dynamic panel data framework, our findings reveal that financial 
liberalization increases the likelihood of systemic banking crisis at the initial stages of financial 
reform, but there is a threshold level after which financial liberalization can have a positive 
impact on economic growth by reducing the probability of crisis. The results also suggest that all 
indicators of institutions play a less significant role in economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the pioneering works by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), it has been widely 
acknowledged by scholars and policymakers that financial liberalization leads to more economic 
development (Kapur (1976), Galbis (1977), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Levine (1997)). 
During the last three decades and following the declaration of the authors of “Financial 
Repression School”1, an increasing number of countries have started the implementation of a 
financial liberalization program as a new strategy to boost their economic growth (Tornell et al, 
2004; Bekaert et al, 2005).. 
Theoretically, the positive effects of financial liberalization could be transmitted to economic 
growth through two main channels which are saving and investment (Venet, 1994). In fact, the 
liberalization of the credit rates has led to an increase of the financial savings which in turn has 
stimulated the investment activities and hence economic growth (De Melo (1986), Bandiera et al. 
(2000), Khan and Hasan (1998), Hermes (2005), Achy (2005). On the other hand, financial 
liberalization was also demonstrated by various studies to have several negative effects on 
economy as a whole. In some case of studies, financial liberalization was considered as 
responsible of the emergence of new banking behavior like high risk appetite and the speculative 
behavior (Kindleberger 1978, Miotti and Plihon 2001, Llewellyn 2002, Kaminsky & Reinhart, 
1999, Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996).). Furthermore, financial liberalization opened the financial 
sectors to external shocks and it increased uncertainty and competition between banks and also 
between banks and non-banks as well (Demetriades and Luintel (2001), Bertrand et al. (2007), 
Cubillas and Gonzalez (2014). All these transformation in the banking sector has increased the 
fragility of banks and has led to several banking crises (Fisher and Chenard (1997), Hermosillo 
and Pazarbasioglu (1997), Demirgüç Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Fsher, Gureye and Ortigz 
(1997), Eichengreen and Arteta (2002), Hamdi et al (2013). Hakimi et al. (2011), Majerbi, and 
Rachdi (2014).  
Given the conflicting results on the real impact of financial liberalization on economic growth, 
many empirical studies have tried to explain why some countries have experienced banking crises 
and why some other have not in the aftermath of the implementation of liberalization program. 
                                                          
1
 McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
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These studies revealed the crucial role of the institutions in triggering or limiting or even stopping 
banking crisis. By institutions we means rule of law, regulatory quality, control of corruption, 
political stability, institutional context.      
In this paper, we aim at exploring the interactions between financial liberalization, banking crises 
and economic growth in the presence of indicators of the quality of institution for the case of ten 
Middle East and North African (MENA henceforth) countries observed during the period 1990-
2013. Generally, papers on MENA countries have been focused on the role of financial sector 
development on growth (Ben Nacer and Ghazouani, 2007, Ben Naceur et al.  2008) and the 
consequence of liberalization of growth (Achy 2006, Gammoudi and Cherif 2015). However, to 
the best of our knowledge there is no published paper yet that investigated the association 
between liberalization, crises and growth by taking into consideration the quality of institutions. 
Therefore this paper is the first attempt to fill the gap. To reach this goal, we perform an 
econometric model based on the System General Method of Moment (SGMM) estimation. The 
empirical results indicate that banking crisis has a negative impact on economic growth whereas 
financial liberalization appears to enhance growth. We also find that all indicators of institutions 
play a less significant role in economic growth.  
The remainder of this paper is as following: literature review is given in section 2, in section 3 we 
present the econometric method and we discuss the major findings while section 4 concludes.  
2. Brief literature Review 
The relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth has been a subject of 
debate by many academic researchers. Since the early 1970s and following the recommendations 
of the authors of “Financial Repression School”, notably McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
many countries have launched a program of financial liberalization. According to those authors, 
financial liberalization is considered as a key of dynamic and modern financial system and rapid 
growth.  
However, despite the McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973)’ recommendations, the empirical 
studies investigating the association between financial liberalization and growth have provided 
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some conflicting results. In fact, researchers of the so called “Neo-Structualist School” have 
found that financial liberalization increase the likelihood of banking crises and could harm the 
natural level of growth. For example, the study by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
analyzed the linkage between financial liberalization and banking crises for a sample of 53 
countries during the period 1980-1995. Their results indicate that the likelihood of banking crises 
is more important in liberalized financial systems. However, in the presence of high quality of 
institutional environment, the impact of financial liberalization on a fragile banking sector is 
weaker. In the same line of idea, the relationship between financial liberalization and the 
occurrence of banking crises was tested by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). They analyze 76 
currency crises and 26 banking crises for 20 countries during 1970 to mid-1995. Their result 
reveals that that financial liberalization often precedes banking crises. Similarly, Ahmed (2013) 
investigated the relationship between financial liberalization, financial development and 
economic growth for a panel of 21 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the period of 
1981–2009, By performing dynamic panel data and Generalized-Method-of-Moments (GMM) 
method, results indicate that there is a negative association between financial liberalization and 
economic growth. Furthermore, Ahmed’s findings show that financial liberalization does not 
exert a positive effect on financial development in SSA region 
In another mixed results, the study by Bumann et al. (2013) provided a meta-analysis related to 
the relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth in more 60 empirical 
studies. Findings indicate that on average, financial liberalization acts positively on the economic 
growth but the effect remains not significantly. They also find that studies conducted from 1970s 
reveal a less significantly association between financial liberalization and economic growth more 
than studies using data from the 1980s. More recently, Hamdi and Jlassi (2014) focused on 
whether capital flows trigger banking crises and threat economic stability and growth. To this 
end, they used a sample of 58 developing countries during the period 1984–2007. Contrary to the 
previous study which are based on dummy variable or index of financial liberalization, this 
research has used two common financial liberalization indicators (defacto and dejure). The major 
finding of this study is that financial liberalization is not the first and unique raison for the 
occurrence of banking crises. Banking crises in those developing countries are more explained by 
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the foreign debt liabilities and foreign direct investment liabilities which remain to increase the 
likelihood of banking crises.   
The inconclusive relationship between financial liberalization, banking crises and economic 
growth has motivated many empirical researches to explore other factors that could explain this 
confusing outcome. Therefore, scholars have asked why some countries have experienced crises 
and slow growth following the liberalization of their financial sector while some others have seen 
rapid growth.  As a response, researchers turned to the macroeconomic and institutional context 
on which the program of financial liberalization was adopted. Obviously, it was shown that when 
financial liberalization is implemented in a stable macroeconomic context and in a favorable 
institutional environment economic growth will be enhanced remarkably. However, the adoption 
of these reforms in a country with a weak quality of institutions and in an uncertain universe will 
slowdown the level of economic growth economic (North 1989, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2005), Ranciere et al. (2006). The study by Bonfiglioli et al. (2004) analyzed the effects of 
financial liberalization and banking crises on growth using a sample of 90 countries observed in 
the period 1975-1999. The econometric strategy performed in this study is the GMM dynamic 
panel data. In this research, financial liberalization leads on average to more economic growth. 
However, banking crises is seemed to impede growth. This negative effect is less significant in 
countries with high quality of institutions and in an open financial system. In another case study, 
Edwards (2007) investigated the adequacy between financial reforms and the robustness of the 
economy to accommodate radical changes. Based on a dataset of Latin America region during the 
period of 1970-2004, results indicate that the economy of those countries was not able to receive 
this sharp reversal and the occurrence of banking crises in this region was very costly in term of 
economic growth. Similarly, study of Ben Gamra (2009) on 6 major emerging East Asian 
countries over the period 1980–2002, focused on the intensity and the sequence of financial 
liberalization. His results indicate that partial liberalization leads to more growth than full 
liberalization.   
Recently, the linkage between institutions and growth has been investigated by Siddiqui and 
Ahmed (2013). Data of 84 countries performed with panel OLS and GMM-based estimation 
method reveals that favorable institutions positively affect economic growth.  In another recent 
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study, Gammoudi and Cherif (2015) analyzed how financial liberalization, in particular capital 
account openness and political institutions impacts foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Middle 
East and North Africa  (MENA) region. In this study, FDI is considered an important key of rapid 
growth. To this end, they used a sample of 17 MENA countries over the period 1985 to 2009. 
The empirical strategy performed in this study is the GMM estimator. Results show that the 
capital account liberalization attracts more FDI when the host country known a political stability. 
Findings indicate also, that countries with high quality of institutions, less corrupted and 
enforcing propriety rights are able to attract more FDI. To conclude, all these recent studies 
supported the idea that qualities of institutions have a stronger effect on long term growth than in 
the short run (Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)).  
3. Econometric methodology  
3.1. Data and methodology 
The present research explores 10 MENA countries including: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia observed during the period 1990-
2013; hence we have a total of 240 observations. In this initial step we will identify the factors 
that affect growth by including financial liberalization and crises. The model is expressed as 
follows:  
Growth = f(FL, Crises, M) 
                                   Growth it = β 0 + β1FL i, t + β2 Crises i, t + β3 M i, t + ε i, t                   (1) 
Where: Growth denotes the real GDP per capita growth. FL is an index of financial liberalization. 
Crises are the crisis dummy for country i at time t (Cf. Table 1). M represents the vector of 
explanatory variables including: inflation (Inf), trade (Tade), government size (GSize) and 
population (Pop)). ε is the error term. A definition of all the variables and their sources is 
provided in Appendix 1. 
In the second step, we introduce the variable (Inst) to the model in order to assess the role of 
institutions in triggering or limiting a banking crisis. This variable refers to the quality of 
institutions in a given country. Therefore, the model will take the following new expression: 
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Growth = f(FL, Crises, Institution, M) 
Growth it = β 0 + β1FL i, t + β2 Inst i, t + β3 Crises i, t + β4 (FL it * Isntit) + β5 M i, t + ε i, t                       (2) 
The variable Institution includes some indicators such as Law and order (Lawor), Corruption 
(Cor), internal conflicts (Intconf), Democratic accountability (Demacc), External conflicts 
(Extconf), socioeconomic conditions (Socecoc) and Investment profile (Invespro). (FL it * Insti it) 
represents the interaction between financial liberalization and the quality of institutions.  
The aim of this paper is to estimate whether financial liberalization and institutional environment 
explain why banking crises occur in some MENA countries. To this end we investigate the 
problem of the possible endogeneity and reverse causality by means of the system Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) estimator in dynamic panel data models initially proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and later by Blundell and Bond (1998). This method could be 
considered as the suitable one used in this kind of research as it has a lower bias and higher 
efficiency than other estimators if certain persistence exists in the series (Soto, 2009). 
3.2. Empirical results 
3.2.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
In the empirical section, we start our analysis by providing some descriptive statistics for all the 
variables described above including means, maximums, minimums and standard deviation. The 
results exposed in Table 1 show that the average level of growth and inflation are 2.34 % and 
7.53% respectively while the average level of trade is 74.539 % with a maximum of 154.64% and 
a minimum of 29.29%.  For variables which reflected the quality of institutions, we find that 
corruption reached an average of 2.531% with a minimum of 1% and a maximum of 4%. The 
average level of law and order is 4.11%; with a maximum value is 6% while its minimum value 
is 1%.  The average value of investment profile is 7.22%; its maximum value is 11.5% while its 
minimum value is 1.08%.  For the external conflict variable, the average level is 9.48%; its 
minimum value is 0 % and 12 % as maximum value. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std.  Min Max 
Growth 
Gsize  
240 
240 
2.431  
17.708 
4.405 
7.434 
-8.947 
10.285 
35.371 
76.222 
Inf 240 7.534 11.103 -3.846 80.742 
Trade 240 74.539 25.749 29.296 154.645 
Pop 240 1.889 3.577 -44.408 11.180 
Crises 240 0.068 0.253 0 1 
Fl 
Intconf 
Demacc 
Lawor 
Cor 
Extconf 
Invespro 
240 
240 
240 
240 
240 
240 
240 
1.113 
9.095 
2.833 
4.117 
2.531 
9.482 
7.227 
0.435 
2.243 
1.370 
1.147 
0.859 
1.768 
2.155 
1 
1.5 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1.08 
2 
12 
6 
6 
4 
12 
11.5 
Socecoc 240 5.807 1.505 1 11 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients of the variables used in our models. The correlation 
matrix gives information on the level (high or low) and the nature (positive or negative) of 
linkage between the variables. The Table 2 reveals a weak correlation between the different 
variables and this is enough condition to reject the existence of multicolinearity problem.  
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of institutional measures 
 
  Growth   Gsize Inf Trade Pop Crises FL Intconf Demacc Lawor Cor Extconf Invespro Socecoc 
Growth 1.0000 
Gsize -0.3112 1.0000 
Inf -0.3207 -0.1084 1.0000 
Trade 0.0960 0.3915 -0.2774 1.0000 
Pop -0.2974 0.2826 0.1521 0.4245 1.0000 
Crises -0.1511 -0.2375 0.4503 -0.1567 0.0074 1.0000 
FL 0.1941 0.1450 -0.5189 0.5538 0.1021 -0.4491 1.0000 
Intconf 0.2261 0.0225 -0.4615 0.3678 -0.1433 0.0107 0.3965 1.0000 
Demacc -0.0768 0.2344 0.0992 0.3476 0.3026 0.2045 0.0630 0.0083 1.0000 
Lawor 0.1559 0.2762 -0.5305 0.1987 -0.2448 -0.3000 0.5214 0.3437 -0.1505 1.0000 
Cor -0.1703 0.3381 0.2548 0.3653 0.3602 0.3431 0.0023 0.2422 0.3477 0.1251 1.0000 
Extconf 0.1166 -0.1397 -0.0345 0.0732 -0.2256 0.0256 0.2198 0.4022 -0.0242 0.2856 0.0877 1.0000 
Invespro 0.3203 -0.0728 -0.6106 0.1433 -0.4419 -0.3050 0.5542 0.3328 -0.0051 0.4397 -0.1611 0.3224 1.0000 
Socecoc 0.0500 -0.3648 0.0863 -0.1477 -0.2333 0.2475 -0.1545 0.4862 -0.2250 0.2787 0.1773 0.3289 0.0381 1.0000 
It appears from the correlation matrix that government size, inflation and population are 
negatively correlated with growth. Similarly, crisis is also negatively linked to growth. At a first 
glance, we can conclude that crises hamper economic growth in MENA countries. However, 
trade is positively associated with economic growth such as financial liberalization. Here we can 
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draw a second important result which is that unlike crises, FL appears to boost economic growth 
in MENA region. In the next section, we will see whether the econometric model will confirm 
the validity of these conclusions or not. 
 
3.2.2. Output of the model 
 
We use the GMM in system (SGMM) since it has been proved to improve the GMM estimator in 
the first differenced (DGMM) model in terms of bias and root mean squared error.  According to 
Blundell and Bond (1998) the SGMM estimator performs better than the DGMM estimator 
because the instruments in the Level model remain good predictors for the endogenous variables 
in this model even when the series are very persistent (Bun and Windmeijer, 2010). This allows 
the introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically improve efficiency. It builds a system 
of two equations-the original equation as well as the transformed one-and is known as SGMM.  
This approach has been widely used in the studies on economic growth. 
 
Broadly, the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for AR (1) process in first 
differences usually rejects the null hypothesis. The test for AR (2) in first differences is more 
important, because it will detect autocorrelation in levels. The validity of the instruments is tested 
using a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and a test of the absence of serial correlation 
of the residuals. The Sargan test has a null hypothesis of “the instruments as a group are 
exogenous”. Therefore the higher the p-value of the Sargan statistic the better the results are.  
The results of equation 1 are displayed in table 3 below and the specification tests are reported at 
the bottom of the tables. 
Equation 1 has been tested in three phases. In the first one, we just had a look at the factors that 
influence economic growth in MENA countries beyond financial liberalization and crises. We 
find in column 1 that government size affects negatively and significantly level of growth at the 
level of 5% while trade and inflation exert a negative but non-significant impact on GDP per 
capita. We also find that population contributes positively and significantly to the economic 
growth.  
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When we introduced the variable FL the output (column 2) remains the same as in Model1 but 
the most important result is that financial liberalization appears to have a positive and significant 
impact on economic growth. This result is similar to the conclusions of the previous studies 
found by Levine (2001), Levine (2006), Bumann et al. (2013), Hakimi et al. (2011), etc. In the 
third step, we introduced the variable crises to see their impact on growth (colum3) and 
unsurprisingly the variable appears to affect economic growth negatively and significantly at the 
level of 5%. The signs of the other variables rest unchanged. This result joints most of the studies 
that reveal the disastrous impacts of crises (banking, currency, systemic or economic) on 
economic growth notably Barro, (2001), Hutchison and Noy, (2005), Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Detragiache, and Gupta, (2006). 
Table 3: Result of SGMM (Eq.1). Dependent variable is Economic Growth (Growth) 
 
      Model 1      Model 2         Model 3 
L.Growth -0.259 -0.509 -1.906 
 (1.95)** (2.19)** (3.48)*** 
Gsize -1.133 -6.728 -5.506 
 (1.77)* (1.60)* (1.73)* 
Inf. -0.079 -0.078 -0.119 
 (1.05) (0.41) (0.56) 
Trade -0.039 -0.328 0.504 
 (0.54) (1.25) (1.01) 
Pop 5.097 3.344 6.160 
 (1.23)* (1.32) (0.91) 
FL.  3.176** 2.165** 
  (0.83) (0.76) 
Crises   -4.935* 
   (0.66) 
Nb. of Obs            240           240              240 
Wald test χ2 
AR (2) test 
P-value AR (2) test 
Sargan test 
     32.18*** 
0.465 
0.642 
7.721 
20.44*** 
-0.404 
0.683 
6.782 
22.23*** 
0.866 
0.386 
6.935 
P-value Sargan test 1.000 1.000 1.000 
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels of significance, respectively 
Estimation method is GMM-in-System estimator. AR (2): test of null of zero second-order serial correlation, distributed N (0, 1) 
under null. The null hypothesis is that errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. Sargan: 
Sargan test for validity of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as indicated under null. This test of over-identifying 
restrictions is asymptotically distributed as χ² under the null of instrument validity.  
In the second phase of analysis, we estimated equation 2 which includes different variables that 
refer to the quality of institutions as well as its interaction with the variable FL. As we mentioned 
previously, the aim of introducing institutional variables is identify their role in occurring a crisis. 
The different results are displayed in table 4 and the joint significance test for these terms and the 
specification tests are reported at the bottom of the tables. 
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  Table 4: Result of SGMM (Eq.2). Dependent variable is Economic Growth (Growth) 
                 Model1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
L.Growth -0.238 -0.177 -0.122 -0.224 -0.174 -0.106 -0.32 -5.704 -0.677 
(1.83)* (1.77)* (2.38)** (1.86)* (2.36)** (2.32)** (3.95)***       (2.37)*** (1.69)* 
Inf -0.439 -0.456 -0.475 -0.507 -1.142 -0.208 -0.403 -1.086 -2.782 
(-1.38) (3.52)*** (-1.44) (4.22)*** (-1.22) (-0.6) (-0.92) (-1.23) (1.61)* 
Trade 0.001 -0.033 -0.06 -0.059 0.017 -0.127 -0.018 1.125 -0.192 
(-0.01) (-0.38) (-0.52) (-0.36) (-0.21) (-1.04) (-0.22) (1.29) (-1.03) 
Gsize -0.297 -0.687 -0.162 -1.552 -0.799 -1.117 -0.382 1.363 -0.385 
(-0.29) (-0.54) (-0.23) (-0.87) (-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.4) (1.65)* (-1.4) 
Pop -2.164 -2.333 -2.133 -1.205 -1.448 -2.293 -1.719 3.439 5.262 
(2.45)** (3.59)*** (1.82)* (-0.84) (-1.01) (2.19)** (2.69)*** (-0.66) (1.85)** 
Fl 9.252 5.273 0.482 1.684 -6.275 2.67 2.97 2.136 -1.235 
(-0.84) (-1.26) (-1.38) (-0.98) (-0.1) (-0.64) (-0.41) (-0.66) (-1.44) 
Crises -9.792 -1.544 -4.861 -4.218 -10.709 -5.64 -1.091 -5.635 -2.523 
(-0.71) (-0.2) (-0.69) (-0.27) (-0.5) (-0.78) (-0.16) (-0.53) -(1.59)* 
      
Institutional variables  
  
  
    
Intconf 
-0.352 -2.193 -1.722 
 (-0.78) (1.61)* (-0.63) 
Demacc  1.756 1.192 0.658 
 (1.99)** (0.44) (-1.29) 
Lawor 2.855 3.143 1.59* 
 
 (2.20)** (1.84)*    (-0.823) 
Cor 
-0.603 -4.232 -1.313 
 (-0.15) (2.32)** (1.58)* 
Extconf 3,378 -8.734 -1.143 
 (-1,3) (-1.03)     (2.05)** 
Invespro 1.567 3.442 -2.564 
 (-1.34) (1.78)* (-0.54) 
Soecoc -3.176 -1.158 -3.176 
(1.07) (-0.98) (-1.07) 
                
Interaction terms 
        
Fl*Intconf -5.774 -1.722 
(-0.94) (-0.63) 
Fl*Demacc  -3.036 -1.236 
(-1.07) (1.99)** 
Fl* Lawor -9.037 -1.675 
(-1.26) (1.62)* 
Fl*Cor -2,914 -3.423 
(-1,05) (2.32)** 
Fl*Extconf -3,321 -1.875 
(-1,72)* (1.67)* 
Fl*Invespro -8,619 -2.957 
(-1,0) (-0.59) 
Fl*Soecoc -1.131 -2.564 
(-0.14) (-0.99) 
Nb. of Obs  240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Wald test χ2 55.14*** 27.01*** 16.98*** 13.93*** 19.03*** 24.07 16.29*** 16.77*** 
AR (2) test 1.21 1.03 1.11 1.06 1.11 0.63 0.418 -1.294 
P-value  0.228 0.302 0.266 0.289 0.269 0.53 0.685 0.195 
Sargan test 1.76 2.27 1.77 1.38 2.25 2.79 6.612 1.082 
P-value  0.995 0.986 0.995 0.998 0.987 0.972 1.000 1.000 
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The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels of significance, respectively 
 
Estimation method is GMM-in-System estimator. AR (2): test of null of zero second-order serial correlation, distributed N (0, 1) 
under null. The null hypothesis is that errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. Sargan: 
Sargan test for validity of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as indicated under null. This test of over-identifying 
restrictions is asymptotically distributed as χ² under the null of instrument validity.  
In the first seven models, we have introduced to the first equation (equation1) a new variable that 
refers to the quality of institution and we have also added the interaction between the chosen 
variable along with financial liberalization (FL). The purpose of this methodology is to identify 
the consequence of such institution in triggering or limiting a financial crisis and also to see its 
impact on growth. For model 8, we have introduced all the variables of institutions and then we 
have added the interaction terms in model 9. By using this framework we can obtain a 
comprehensive study which could be consistent to get reliable results.  
From the table above we can draw several important results. Frist of all, it is worth mentioning 
that for all the models, the Sargan and serial-correlation tests do not reject the null hypothesis of 
correct specification (P-value of Sargan test and P-value of AR (2) test of Arellano and Bond are 
larger than 5%).  From table 4 we can see that all the common dependent variables have the same 
signs like what we have found in the previous estimations of equation 1 even after adding 
variables of institution. We can also conclude from Table 5 that the signs of most coefficients of 
financial liberalization (FL) are consistent with the previous literature showing the positive 
impact of liberalization on economic growth (Levine 2001, Claessens and Leaven 2003, 
Schmukler, 2004, Levine 2005, Hakimi et al 2013, Ben Jedidia et al. (2014), etc.). The positive 
and mostly significant coefficient confirms that the FL is associated with more growth except 
when using external conflicts as a proxy of institutional quality. External conflicts are indubitably 
a serious risk that can threat a local economy through the contagion effects when the financial 
market is liberalized. In an open-ended economy, crises could be transmitted easily to the local 
economy and this makes liberalization program unsuccessful and fruitless. 
The second important conclusion to be drawn from the table above is that the interaction the 
liberalization variable (FL) with the various indicators of institutional variables (Instit) and 
banking crisis (Crises) we find a positive and significant coefficient for the FL variable while 
banking crisis has a negative and significant coefficient regardless of the institutional variables 
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used.  All the interaction coefficients with the institutional variables are negative. This result 
suggests that better institutional quality help decrease the probability of banking crisis for a given 
level of financial liberalization. The inverted U-shaped relationship between liberalization and 
crisis seems to be robust to the inclusion of the institutional variables. Overall, and regardless of 
the level of liberalization, the probability of crisis is always lower with improved institutional 
quality. 
Third, it is obvious that the coefficients of banking crisis are negative for all models. Therefore, 
banking crises have a negative impact on growth. This sign is consistent across all previous 
studies (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Weller (2001), Eichengreen and Arteta (2002)). 
Increase of financial reform leading to higher levels of liberalization of the financial system seem 
to increase the likelihood of systemic banking crisis up to a certain level, after which more 
liberalization results in lower probability of crisis as countries get closer to being fully 
liberalized. For MENA countries, economies are partially liberalized and for this reason the 
number of crisis is limited.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this study, using dynamic panel model, we specified an empirical framework to investigate the 
impact of financial liberalization, banking crisis and institutions quality on the economic growth 
of 10 MENA countries over the period 1990-2013.  This study uses MENA countries to fill the 
gap of literature since no paper until this date that has investigated this important issue.  
Overall, our findings provide some interesting new insights that financial liberalization increases 
the likelihood of systemic banking crisis at the initial stages of financial reform, but there is a 
threshold level after which financial liberalization can have a positive impact on economic 
growth by reducing the probability of crisis. We conclude that the turning point or the threshold 
after which liberalization starts to reduce likelihood of crisis occurs earlier (or at lower degrees of 
liberalization) in countries with better institutions compared to countries with weak institutional 
environments. The results suggest also that the type of institutional variables that may be most 
effective in mitigating the liberalization effect on crisis. In the MENA region, policy makers 
should target in priority to enhance the institutional environment when implementing new 
14 
 
financial reforms. A sound well-functioning banking sector leads to provide sustained economic 
growth.   
Appendix 1. Definitions of all variables 
Variables Definition Source 
 
Economic Growth 
Inflation  
Trade 
Government size 
Population 
 
Financial 
liberalization 
 
 
 
 
 
Banking crisis 
 
 
Law and order 
 
 
Corruption 
 
 
Socioeconomic 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
Investment profile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External conflicts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democratic 
accountability 
 
 
Real GDP per capita growth 
Change in consumer price index 
Import plus export divided to GDP                                   
Ratio of Government final consumption to GDP 
Growth rate of total population 
 
This index includes three components: capital account, the domestic 
financial system, and the stock market. For each component, a value of 
1 indicates no liberalization, 2 indicates partial liberalization, and 3 
indicates full liberalization. The overall Financial Liberalization 
variable (also varying between 1 and 3) is obtained by averaging the 
values across the three components. 
 
Crisis that takes a value of one when the country is experiencing a 
banking crisis, and zero otherwise. 
 
Measure of the law and order tradition of a country. It ranges from 6, 
strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition. 
 
The level of corruption ranges from 0 (high level of corruption) to 4 
(low level).  
 
This is an assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society 
that could constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction. 
The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a 
maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A 
score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to 
Very High Risk. 
 
This is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are 
not covered by other political, economic and financial risk components. 
The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a 
maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A 
score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to 
Very High Risk. 
 
The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the 
incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent 
external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade 
restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent external 
pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-out war). The risk rating assigned 
is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four 
points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to 
Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk. 
 
This is a measure of how responsive government is to its people, on the 
basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that the 
government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly 
violently in a non-democratic one. 
WDI 
WDI 
WDI 
WDI 
WID 
 
Kaminsky and Schuler 2008; 
Neumann et al. 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
 
 
 
 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
 
 
 
 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
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